

# **Policy or Peasants: Who Can Build the “Bridge over China's Troubled Waters?”**


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# Grain production in China, 1950s – 2000s



# Competition for Water

- More and more water being allocated to urban and industrial uses

- National policy:



## Water use priorities

Urban residential

Industry

Rural residential


Irrigation




# Hai River Basin Surface Water Flows – 1980 to 2006



Billions meter<sup>3</sup>




# Increase of Tubewells in China



# Increase of Groundwater Irrigation in north China, 2004

Crop	% of irrigated sown area from Groundwater
Rice	24
Wheat	72
Maize	70
Cotton	70
Field vegetables	67

# North China: Falling Groundwater Table




- ◆ Bailuobao Station (Feixiang County)
- Jiuzhou Station (Ren County)
- ▲ Longhua Station (Baixiang County)

# Is China Facing a Water Crisis?

- Some say yes. It could push China to “starve the world”.
- Others argue good policy can solve the problem  
[Sound policy bridges can be built over even the most troubled waters!]
- Who is right?
- Who is to blame? / What can be done?


Data set – collected by CAS, Stanford University and UC Davis in 2005,  
400 village; 50 counties, 6 provinces

National Representative of North China



# Depth to groundwater in GW Using Villages

Estimated Density  
~% of villages



# Although groundwater levels are falling, the nature of the fall varies across North China

## Change in Average Water Level 1995-2004

- Increased **9%**
  - No Change **26%**
  - Decreased < 0.25 m/year **18%**
  - Decreasing 0.25 to 1.5 m/year **38%**
  - Decreasing > 1.5 m/year **11%**
- } **51%**
- |                               |     |       |
|-------------------------------|-----|-------|
| Increased                     | 9%  | } 51% |
| No Change                     | 26% |       |
| Decreased < 0.25 m/year       | 18% |       |
| Decreasing 0.25 to 1.5 m/year | 38% |       |
| Decreasing > 1.5 m/year       | 11% |       |

Where there is a problem, is there a response by the government?

# Water Policies of MWR

- Wells drilled by permit only
- Regulation on well spacing
- Water extraction fee
- Moving towards pricing policy
- Irrigation management reform

# Actual policy implementation: almost ZERO!

- Wells drilled by permit only **Less than 10% of wells**
- Regulation on well spacing **Less than 5% of villages**
- Water extraction fee **Zero**
- Moving towards pricing policy **Not very fast**
- Irrigation management reform **Cannot be implemented**

## **effectively**

*No wonder ... how do you assume control over 7.6 million wells ... an administrative impossibility*

Is the government building  
the “bridges”?

*No ... obviously!*

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
Are policymakers a part of  
“troubling the waters?”

*YES: through their non-action*

Is there a response by farmers?

# Rapid rise of Privatization of Wells

% of private wells in Hebei and Henan province




According to the six province survey in north China, 69% of wells are now owned by private individuals in 2004.

Privatization of wells does not lead to GW conservation

# Changes in surface water managerial form

% of Sample villages



Not all WUA or Contracting provided with incentives to save water

Are farmers building the “bridges”?

*No. No incentive to do so!*

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Are farmers a part of “troubling the waters?”

Almost by definition: YES

BUT, is it their fault?

- Could it be that they are doing exactly what we should expect them to do – given the policy environment?
- Could it be that they would just as easily be part

of the solution – given the right incentives?


# **In fact, research has shown us the basis of some bridges**

- Water pricing ...
  - Do farmers respond to higher prices by using less water?
- Water saving technology ...
  - Do farmers respond to higher prices by adopting water-saving technologies?

# Farmers' response at the intensive margin: Reduction in water use per unit of land

Average water depth (m)	Average cost of water (yuan/m <sup>3</sup> )	Average volume of water applied to wheat (m <sup>3</sup> /mu)
4.4	0.096	513
6.7	0.084	306
24.6	0.201	257
77.5	0.414	150

# Farmer's response at the extensive margin: Changes in cropping mix



Luancheng County  
(relatively water-abundant area)



Cang County  
(water-short area)



## Would price policy work?

- If China raised the price of water (e.g., by taxing electricity / diesel fuel) → would lead to sharp declines in demand → lots of conservation, adoption of water saving technology.
- But, the incomes of farmers would suffer ... need a complementary policy to give farmers a subsidy to offset higher costs ...

# Share of Sown Areas Adopting Water Saving Technologies in north China

	1995	2004
<b>Traditional (pre 1949)</b> Level Fields, Border/Furrow Irrigation	20%	25%
<b>Household-based</b> Plastic Sheeting, Surface Pipe, Drought Resistant Varieties, Retain Stubble / No Till	8%	21%
<b>Community-based</b> Underground Pipe, Lined Canals, Sprinklers	3%	7%

# Implications for Development and Growth

- Reducing production of water-using crops
  - Reduction in winter wheat
  - Shift from wheat-maize systems to single season maize
  - Probably from rice to maize
- Is this a problem?      NO!
  - Domestic demand is falling for food grains and rising for meats (and derived demand for maize)
  - Supply response in international market will also dampen the impact of China's increase in imports on international

# Implications for Development and Growth

- there is rising demand for fruits and vegetables in domestic and export markets
- although water intensive, high value ==> investment into greenhouses and water-saving technologies



China – like many developing countries – are ready to build bridges over troubled waters.

“If I knew a water policy worked and if I knew where an investment would have the most effect, I would allocate up to a quarter of my budget to this one activity!”

Du Ying, Director of the Agricultural Division,  
Development and Reform Commission, Beijing,  
August 30, 2004